

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 28 1986

JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE)
CORPORATION, in its corporate)
capacity,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.) NO. 86-C-466-B
)
RUSTY JAY and KAREN ROCHELLE)
WOODS,)
)
Defendants.)

JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST
RUSTY J. WOODS AND KAREN ROCHELLE WOODS

THIS case comes on for consideration upon the Application of Plaintiff, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), in its corporate capacity, for the entry of a default judgment. The Court hereby finds as follows:

1. Complaint and Summons in this action were served upon the defendants, Rusty J. Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods, on June 3, 1986, by personal service.

2. The time within which the defendants, Rusty J. Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods, had to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint has expired.

3. Rusty J. Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods have not answered or otherwise responded to the Complaint and the time for the defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint has not been extended by this Court.

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §1819 and 28 U.S.C. §1331. The

Court has personal jurisdiction over Rusty J. Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods.

5. The Woods initiated bankruptcy proceedings on July 11, 1983, in California, but those proceedings were subsequently transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

6. Garden Grove Community Bank ("Garden Grove") was a creditor of the Woods. On March 7, 1984, Garden Grove and the Woods entered into a Stipulation and Reaffirmation Agreement whereby the Woods agreed to reaffirm the debt owed to Garden Grove in the principal sum of \$12,883.33, together with applicable interest. The Reaffirmation Agreement provided that the Woods would pay Garden Grove \$150.00 per month, beginning April 1, 1984, until the amount owing under the Reaffirmation Agreement was executed and approved by the Bankruptcy Court in accord with applicable law.

7. The State Superintendent of Banking for the State of California took possession of the assets of Garden Grove on June 1, 1984, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity, became the owner of the Reaffirmation Agreement between Garden Grove and the Defendants. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the current owner of the Reaffirmation Agreement.

8. The Defendants are in default of their obligations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under the Reaffirmation Agreement because they have failed to pay any amount due thereunder.

9. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is organized and operates under the authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1811, et seq.

10. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation brings this action in its corporate capacity, and all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a party are deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. The District Courts of the United States have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard to amount in controversy.

11. Defendants, Rusty Jay Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods, are liable to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity as the owner of the Reaffirmation Agreement, jointly and severally, in the sum of \$12,883.33 principal, pre-judgment interest at 12 percent per year of \$4,218.06 through November 28, 1986, and post-judgment interest thereafter at 5.77 percent per year.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the Plaintiff, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity, shall have judgment against Defendants, Rusty Jay Woods and Karen Rochelle Woods, as follows: principal due and owing of \$12,883.33, pre-judgment interest of \$4,218.06 through November 28, 1986, and post-judgment interest thereafter at 5.77 percent per year.

DATED, this 28th day of November, 1986.


THOMAS R. BRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Entered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

F I L E

NOV 28 1980

**Jack C. Silver, Clerk
U. S. DISTRICT COURT**

BRUCE BONNETT,
Plaintiff,

vs.

OSTRANDER, SUGG & YORK, INC.;
STANFIELD & O'DELL; TOWN &
COUNTRY BANK; WESLEY THOMPSON;
RICHARD PALMER; and STEVE AND
VENITA WELTER,


Defendants.

No. 85-C-1055-C

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

COMES NOW the plaintiff, Bruce Bonnett, and hereby dismisses his cause of action against the defendant Wesley Thompson only, with prejudice to its refileing, but said dismissal shall in no manner affect plaintiff's action against the remaining defendants, Ostrander, Sugg & York, Inc., Stanfield & O'Dell, Town & Country Bank, Richard Palmer, and Steve and Venita Welter.

Respectfully submitted,



Stephen Jones
JONES & JENNINGS
1100 Broadway Tower
Post Office Box 472
Enid, Oklahoma 73702
405/242-5500

Attorneys for Bruce Bonnett

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE was deposited in the United States Mail this 26 day of Nov, 1986, addressed to:

Tom L. Armstrong
John D. Rothman
Gregory Sherman
Marsh & Armstrong
808 Oneok Place
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

Joel L. Wohlgemuth
John Dowdell
Norman, Wohlgemuth & Thompson
909 Kennedy Building
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103


John B. Stuart
Knight, Wagoner, Stuart,
Wilkerson & Lieber
Post Office Box 1560
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101-1560

Jim Gassaway
Todd Maxwell Henshaw
Houston & Klein, Inc.
3200 University Tower
1722 South Carson
Post Office Box 2967
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101-2967

Lester D. Henderson
125 East Dewey
Post Office Box 205
Sapulpa, Oklahoma 74067

Janet L. Cox
501 Northwest Expressway
Suite 220
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73118

SJ/RN/cb

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several overlapping loops and a long horizontal stroke.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

1986

CHALLENGER MINERALS, INC.,)
a California corporation,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY,)
a Delaware corporation)
)
Defendant.)

No. 84-C-357-E

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS AND WITHDRAWING
AND SETTING ASIDE ORAL RULING, FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND RELATED ORDER

Plaintiff Challenger Minerals Inc. ("Challenger") and Defendant Southern Natural Gas Company ("Southern") filed herein on November 26, 1986, a Joint Motion for an order dismissing with prejudice Challenger's complaint, as amended, against Southern, and Southern's counterclaim against Challenger, and withdrawing and setting aside the Court's oral ruling made on April 7, 1986, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed herein on September 9, 1986, and the related Order filed herein on October 1, 1986. It appears to the Court that the parties have reached a full and amicable settlement of all claims and causes of action which were, or could have been, asserted by and between them in this action. It further appears to the Court that the Court's oral ruling made on April 7, 1986, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed herein on September 9, 1986, and the related Order filed herein on October 1, 1986, were not final, but rather were preliminary and subject to amendment, modifica-

tion, or withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time prior to final judgment, and such oral rulings made on April 7, 1986, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed herein on September 9, 1986, and the related Order filed herein on October 1, 1986, should therefore be withdrawn, set aside, and held to be of no force or effect, for the purposes of this or any other litigation or proceeding. The Court therefore finds that such Joint Motion should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Challenger's complaint, as amended, against Southern be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Southern's counterclaim against Challenger be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court's oral ruling made on April 7, 1986, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed herein on September 9, 1986, and the related Order filed herein on October 1, 1986, be and the same are hereby withdrawn, set aside, and held to be of no force or effect for the purposes of this or any other litigation or proceeding; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party pay its own costs and attorneys fees.


DATED this ____ day of _____, 1986.

S/ JAMES O. ELLISON

JAMES O. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


Approved this 26th day of

November, 1986.



J. David Jorgenson
Conner & Winters
2400 First National Tower
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
Telephone: 918/586-5711

Attorney for Challenger
Minerals Inc.



John L. Arrington, Jr.
Huffman Arrington Kihle Gaberino & Dunn
1000 ONEOK Plaza
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
Telephone: 918/585-8141

Attorney for Defendant Southern
Natural Gas Company

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED
NOV 26 1986

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY)
OF TULSA, TRUSTEE OF THE MARY THOMPSON)
WILLIAMS TESTAMENTARY TRUST,)

THOMAS G. SILVER, CLERK
DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

Civil Action No. 86-C-874-E
Tulsa County District Court
Case No. PT-86-22

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT)
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN)
AFFAIRS, OSAGE AGENCY,)

Defendants.)

STIPULATION OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ACTION

The parties to this action hereby stipulate, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) to dismiss this action without prejudice to a subsequent filing. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorneys' fees.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
OF TULSA, TRUSTEE OF THE MARY
THOMPSON WILLIAMS TESTAMENTARY TRUST

By: Gary B. Wilcox
Gary B. Wilcox
DOERNER, STUART, SAUNDERS,
DANIEL & ANDERSON
1000 Atlas Life Building
Tulsa, OK 74103
(918) 582-1211

Attorney for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, OSAGE AGENCY

By: Peter Bernhardt
Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United
States Attorney
3600 U.S. Courthouse
Tulsa, OK 74103
(918) 581-7463

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 26th day of November, 1986, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of Action was mailed, with proper postage prepaid thereon, to:

Billie Louise Webster
2355 South Gary Place
Tulsa, OK 74114

Scott W. Bradshaw
5820 South Evanston
Tulsa, OK 74105

Alice Ann Bradshaw Allen
2501 East Prospect
Ponca City, OK 74604

William Kenneth Anquoe
2134 South Boston Place
Apartment A
Tulsa, OK 74114

John W. Tiger
6707 East 12th
Tulsa, OK 74114

Nicki Louise Webster Thomas
Route 4, Box 270½
Vinita, OK 74301

Nicholas G. Webster
2355 South Gary Place
Tulsa, OK 74114



Gary B. Wilcox

Entered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NOV 26 1986

JACK C. DAVEN, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CHERIE ELAINE BURGESS,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 MPSI NORTH AMERICAS, INC., an)
 Oklahoma corporation,)
 MPSI SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware)
 corporation, and MPSI AMERICAS,)
 INC., an Oklahoma corporation,)
)
 Defendants.)

No. 86-C-109-B ✓

O R D E R

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the briefs, affidavits, and the exhibits and finds as follows:

Defendants in their motion for summary judgment seek a determination on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim and the Title VII claim. This Court entered an order on June 3, 1986, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action. In that order the Court concluded the plaintiff had stated a claim for breach of contract if the published employee and personnel manuals constituted the contract between the parties. The Court's order questioned whether the plaintiff was considered for her original job, whether her original job was available, or whether any other position at a similar level of responsibility or compensation was available after she returned from her maternity leave. The Court also lacked evidence to indicate why the plaintiff was discharged.

Now, however, there exists sufficient testimony, affidavits and undisputed facts by which the Court can determine the breach of contract claim. The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the plaintiff was properly discharged due to the lack of work in defendants' business. It is apparent from the testimony and affidavits that there is ample support for the defendants' claim that the plaintiff was discharged for lack of work. (See Deposition of Davis at 13). Mark Davis, the General Manager of Production for MPSI Americas, Inc., testified that the plaintiff was discharged for lack of work. (Davis Depo. at 13). Davis further testified that there was a lack of work in the plaintiff's department which required a reduction at the time she was discharged (Davis Depo. at 14) and the plaintiff admitted during her deposition that such a decline had occurred in her area. (Burgess Depo. at 82). In support of the lack of work rationale the defendants offered the testimony of Davis that four project leader positions and approximately sixteen team member positions were eliminated from shortly before to shortly after the plaintiff's discharge. (Davis Depo. at 6). It appears from the evidence that a number of these eliminated positions resulted from voluntary resignations.

The plaintiff counters the lack of work argument by stating that forty-seven new hires have been made by the defendants since January 1, 1985. The plaintiff began her approved maternity leave on December 31, 1984, and returned to resume employment on April 15, 1985. Plaintiff was terminated on April 15, 1985. The

plaintiff asserts new hires have been made but does not refute the reduction which took place immediately prior to the plaintiff's termination (the key time period regarding plaintiff's claim). The Court fails to see the relevance of subsequent hires by the defendants absent a showing that during plaintiff's absence persons were hired for jobs which the plaintiff was qualified to perform.

It is apparent from the uncontroverted affidavit of Mark Davis at page 2 that the discharge procedures of the personnel policy manual were adhered to during the termination of the plaintiff. The relevant manual provisions provide:

Employees returning from a leave of absence will be considered for their original job, if available, or other positions at similar levels of responsibility and compensation. Should there not be a position available which is acceptable to the employee, the employee will be released from employment.

* * *

The Company retains the right to release an employee due to lack of work (which may occur as a result of reorganization) or the employee's inability to perform satisfactorily the duties of their position. The company also may discharge an employee for just cause. The company's right to discharge shall be deemed to include the right to suspend, demote or otherwise discipline an employee in lieu of discharge.

* * *

An employee with five or more years of service or in Grade Level 15 or above cannot be terminated without the consent of the president.

The defendants requested and received the consent of the President of the defendant MPSI North Americas, Inc., as required by the manual, before terminating the plaintiff.

In addition to the president's consent to the termination, the affidavit of Mark Davis at page 2 states:

"I conducted a study to determine if other positions existed for plaintiff at the levels of responsibility and compensation similar to her original position and determined none existed."

The plaintiff has offered no evidence that indicates the defendant failed to consider her for other available positions at the time she returned from maternity leave.

The plaintiff does not refute the fact that the defendants properly exercised the procedure in the manuals but argues that seniority in her job should have been a factor in weighing the candidates for termination. Plaintiff admits in her deposition at page 31 that her view of seniority as a factor in the event of layoff was a unilateral expectation not a part of the company policy. The Court finds that the defendants have conclusively demonstrated that lack of work was the reason for the discharge of the plaintiff. The evidence indicates that there was a reduction in the work force at the defendants' company during the period in which the plaintiff was on maternity leave.

The Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact now exists as to the elimination of the plaintiff's position or regarding the termination procedure utilized by the defendant. Therefore, summary judgment is proper as no material issue of fact remains to be decided. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta, 544 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1974), and Ando v. Great Western Sugar Co., 475 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1973).

The defendants also seek summary judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII claim. The plaintiff contends in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment that she has satisfied a prima facie case under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e). In support, the plaintiff cites Felts v. Radio Distributing Company, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 229 (N.D.Ind. 1985), as analogous to her situation. In Felts the Court articulated four requirements to establish a prima facie case under Title VII: (1) that she was a member of a protected class, (2) that her work was satisfactory, (3) that she took a maternity leave of absence with intent to return to work, and (4) that her job was not held open for her contrary to the defendants' practice in medical disability cases.

It is clear under the evidence presented for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff has satisfied the first three criteria of the Felts case. Here, however, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendants' lack of work justification was but a pretext for her dismissal based on pregnancy. The plaintiff has offered no evidence that her pregnant condition formed the basis of the decision to terminate her. Nor does the plaintiff offer evidence that she was treated differently than other people on various types of approved leave. The defendants have offered evidence in the form of an affidavit which shows that some nineteen employees who had taken maternity leave in the past had either returned to their jobs or had voluntarily resigned. The plaintiff has wholly failed to show that her job was not held open for her following her maternity

leave because of her sex and not for lack of work as articulated by the defendants. The plaintiff in explaining her Title VII claim during the deposition stated the following basis for her claim:

Q: All right. Then on paragraph 13 of your Second Amended Complaint, you say the actions were taken without any justifiable basis. On what do you base that statement, that there was no justifiable basis for your discharge?

A: According to my work record, my evaluations. That's all.

Q. All right. And were based entirely upon your sex. How was it based entirely upon your sex?

A. Because I exercised my right to take a maternity leave of absence, and was not allowed to return to work.

Q. Okay. Turning to Page 4 of your Second Amended Complaint, the fact that you exercised your right and were not allowed to return from maternity leave, you believe, is a violation of Title 7, then?

A. Yes.

Q: Is there anything else about that that you believe is a violation of Title 7, about your treatment at MPSI?


A. No.

The Court finds that the plaintiff has wholly failed to establish a prima facie case as required under Title VII. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case the Court believes that the defendants' articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination would be sufficient to rebut her claim. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The plaintiff continues

in her argument in support of her Title VII claim that the defendant had hired 47 new employees since January 1, 1985. This fact would only be relevant if the plaintiff could show that the alleged hirings took place while the plaintiff was on leave and in some way contradicted the defendants' assertion that lack of work caused the layoff. However, the plaintiff has offered nothing to counter the defendants' testimony in affidavits showing that during the plaintiff's leave of absence the number of project leaders was reduced from 16 to 12. Absent such a contradiction, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact remains on the Title VII discrimination claim. Of course, this does not mean that the absence of factual disputes mandates summary judgment. Summary judgment is inappropriate notwithstanding the existence of uncontroverted facts where the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts are in dispute. Lockett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1980). Thus, the relevant question here is whether the undisputed facts permit a reasonable inference of employment discrimination based on sex (pregnancy). The Court is satisfied that the only permissible inference which can be drawn from the facts of this case is that the plaintiff was released from employment due to a slow down in work at the defendant company and not for discriminatory reasons. Therefore, the Court orders that the defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted on the Title VII claim and breach of contract claim.

The parties had initially agreed at the status conference that the defendants MPSI North Americas, Inc., and MPSI Systems, Inc., could be released from the action for the reason that MPSI North Americas was but a former name of MPSI Americas and further that it was unclear if the plaintiff ever worked for defendant MPSI Systems. The plaintiff now objects to the release of MPSI Systems and argues they should remain in the case. In view of the Court's ruling herein, judgment will be rendered in favor of all the defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November, 1986.



THOMAS R. BRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Entered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

MARGARET GILLEY,

)
)
Plaintiff,)

v.

ORA M. BAKER,

)
)
)
)
Defendant.)

NOV 26 1986 *g*

JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

No. 86-C-486-B

✓

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NOW ON this 20 day of November, 1986, it appearing to
the Court that this matter has been compromised and settled, this case is
herewith dismissed with prejudice to the refiling of a future action.

Thomas R. Best
United States District Judge

Entered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

112
NOV 26 1986

JACOB G. LEEVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CHERIE ELAINE BURGESS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MPSI NORTH AMERICAS, INC., an
Oklahoma corporation, MPSI SYSTEMS,
INC., a Delaware corporation, and
MPSI AMERICAS, INC., an Oklahoma
corporation,

Defendants.

No. 86-C-109-B ✓

J U D G M E N T

In accordance with the Court's Order entered November 25, 1986, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants, MPSI North Americas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, MPSI Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and MPSI Americas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, and against the plaintiff, Cherie Elaine Burgess, on her claims. Costs of this action will be assessed against the plaintiff with each party responsible for their own attorney fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November, 1986.


THOMAS R. BRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Entered

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NOV 26, 1986

THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE)
COMPANY, a New Jersey)
corporation,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
JANICE SUE INSALACO CAMPBELL,)
)
Defendant.)

No. 86-C-136-E

JUDGMENT

This action came on for hearing before the Court, Honorable James O. Ellison, District Judge, presiding, and the issues having been duly heard and a decision having been duly rendered,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff North River Insurance Company recover of the Defendant Janice Sue Insalaco Campbell the sum of \$21,163.88, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% per annum from March 1, 1982 until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 5.75% until paid, and its costs of action.

DATED at Tulsa, Oklahoma this 26th day of November, 1986.

James O. Ellison

JAMES O. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FILED

NOV 25 1986

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LEAD RESOURCES, INC., DRUMMOND)
PETROLEUM, LTD., MEC, INC.,)
WAYNE MITCHELL, IVA MITCHELL)
and DAVID SHROFF,)

Plaintiffs,)

vs.)

No. 85-C-432-E

SANTA FE-ANDOVER OIL COMPANY)
and SANTA FE MINERALS, a)
Division of Santa Fe)
International Corporation,)


Defendants.)

STIPULATION ^{OF} ~~FOR~~ DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE


IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between counsel for Plaintiffs, LEAD RESOURCES, INC., DRUMMOND PETROLEUM, LTD., and MEC, INC., and counsel for Defendants, as follows:

1. The claims of Lead Resources, Inc., Drummond Petroleum, Ltd., and MEC, Inc., for damages based on violations of the anti-registration and anti-fraud provisions of the Oklahoma Securities Act, as set forth in the Ninth Cause of Action in the Complaint, shall be dismissed with prejudice as to all parties, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 41(a).

DATED this 24 day of November, 1986.


Ira L. Edwards, Jr. OBA #2637
C. Raymond Patton OBA #6967
David W. Wulfers OBA #9926
HOUSTON AND KLEIN, INC.
3200 University Tower
1722 South Carson
P. O. Box 2967
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101
(918) 583-2131

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS,
LEAD RESOURCES, INC., DRUMMOND
PETROLEUM, LTD., and MEC, INC.


Kent L. Jones
Donald L. Kahl
HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK, GABLE,
COLLINGSWORTH & NELSON, INC.
4100 Bank of Oklahoma Tower
One Williams Center
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74172
(918) 588-2700

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
SANTA FE-ANDOVER OIL COMPANY
and SANTA FE MINERALS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 25 1986

JACK G. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

KENT N. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ANTHONY M. WHITE; EUROSPO
RT
LIMITED; and THE STATE BANK
OF BLUE RAPIDS,

Defendants.

No. 86-C-866 B


Notice of
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

The plaintiff hereby dismisses the above styled and numbered cause without prejudice for the reason that the Court is without jurisdiction because of an absence of complete diversity of citizenship of the several defendants. Knoll v. Knoll, 350 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1965).


CYRUS NORTHROP, OBA# 6711
Attorney for Plaintiff
5001 So. Fulton Ave.
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135
(918) 664-5811

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on the 25th day of November, 1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, with proper postage prepaid thereon, to Todd M. Henshaw of Houston and Klein, Inc., P.O. Box 2967, Tulsa, OK 74101.


CYRUS NORTHROP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

IOWA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.) No. 84-C-809-E
)
KATHY JONES, an individual,)
and CHELSEA INSURANCE AGENCY,)
)
Defendants.)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NOW on this 24th day of Nov., 1986, the above styled and numbered cause coming on for hearing before the undersigned Judge of the United States District Court in and for the Northern District of Oklahoma, upon the Stipulation for Dismissal of the plaintiff and defendants herein; and the Court being fully advised in the premises, is of the opinion that said cause should be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the above styled and numbered cause be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

S/ JAMES O. ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
JIMMY OWENS; LINDA OWENS;)
MILAN M. MARTIN; REVA L. MARTIN;)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.)
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION;)
COUNTY TREASURER, Tulsa County,)
Oklahoma; and BOARD OF COUNTY)
COMMISSIONERS, Tulsa County,)
Oklahoma,)
)
Defendants.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-C-376-E

JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE

This matter comes on for consideration this 24th day of November, 1986. The Plaintiff appears by Layn R. Phillips, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney; the Defendants, County Treasurer, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and Board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, appear by Doris Fransein, Assistant District Attorney, Tulsa County, Oklahoma; the Defendant, State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, appears not, having previously filed its Disclaimer herein; and the Defendants, Jimmy Owens, Linda Owens, Milan M. Martin, and Reva L. Martin, appear not, but make default.

The Court being fully advised and having examined the file herein finds that Defendant, County Treasurer, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on

April 17, 1986; that Defendant, Board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on April 18, 1986; that Defendant, State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on April 22, 1986; and that Defendants, Milan M. Martin and Reva L. Martin, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on April 29, 1986.

The Court further finds that the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, were served by publishing notice of this action in the Tulsa Daily Business Journal & Legal Record, a newspaper of general circulation in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, once a week for six consecutive weeks beginning August 12, 1986 and continuing to September 16, 1986, as more fully appears from the verified Proof of Publication duly filed herein; and that this action is one in which service by publication is authorized by 12 O.S. §2004(C)(3)(c). Since counsel for the Plaintiff does not know and with due diligence cannot ascertain the whereabouts of the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, service cannot be made upon said Defendants within the Northern Judicial District of Oklahoma or the State of Oklahoma by any other method, or upon said Defendants without the Northern Judicial District of Oklahoma or the State of Oklahoma by any other method, as more fully appears from the evidentiary affidavit of a bonded abstracter with respect to the last known addresses of the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens. In addition to the records listed in the evidentiary affidavit, the bonded abstracter also searched the Tulsa City Directory and Tulsa

Telephone Directory. The Court conducted an inquiry into the sufficiency of the service by publication to comply with due process of law and based upon the evidence together with affidavit and documentary evidence finds that the Plaintiff, United States of America, acting on behalf of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, and its attorneys, Layn R. Phillips, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney, have fully exercised due diligence in ascertaining the true names and identities of the parties served by publication, with respect to their present or last known places of residence and/or mailing addresses.

The Court accordingly approves and confirms that the service by publication is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this Court to enter the relief sought by the Plaintiff, both as to the subject matter and the Defendants served by publication.

It appears that the Defendants, County Treasurer, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and Board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, filed their Answers herein on May 9, 1986; that the Defendant, State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, filed its Disclaimer on May 15, 1986, disclaiming any right, title, or interest in the subject real property; that the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, have failed to answer and their default has been entered by the Clerk of this Court on November 7, 1986; and that the Defendants, Milan M. Martin, and Reva L. Martin, have failed to answer and their default has been entered by the Clerk of this Court on June 24, 1986.

The Court further finds that this is a suit based upon a certain mortgage note and for foreclosure of a mortgage securing said mortgage note upon the following described real property located in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, within the Northern Judicial District of Oklahoma:

Lot One (1), Block Three (3), SOUTHTOWN ESTATES EXTENDED ADDITION, an addition in Tulsa County, Oklahoma, according to the recorded plat thereof.

The Court further finds that on June 30, 1983, the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting on behalf of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, their mortgage note in the amount of \$55,000.00, payable in monthly installments, with interest thereon at the rate of 11.5 percent per annum.

The Court further finds that as security for the payment of the above-described note, the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting on behalf of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, a mortgage dated June 30, 1983, covering the above-described property. Said mortgage was recorded on July 1, 1983, in Book 4703, Page 1007, in the records of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.

The Court further finds that by General Warranty Deed dated July 13, 1984, the Defendants, Jimmy Owens and Linda Owens, transferred the subject property to the Defendants, Milan M. Martin and Reva L. Martin. This deed was recorded on July 18, 1984, in Book 4804, Page 3145, in the records of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.

The Court further finds that the Defendants, Jimmy Owens, Linda Owens, Milan M. Martin and Reva L. Martin, made default under the terms of the aforesaid mortgage note and mortgage by reason of their failure to make the monthly installments due thereon, which default has continued, and that by reason thereof the Defendants, Jimmy Owens, Linda Owens, Milan M. Martin, and Reva L. Martin, are indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of \$55,379.36, plus interest at the rate of 11.5 percent per annum from February 1, 1986 until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the legal rate until fully paid, and the costs of this action accrued and accruing.

The Court further finds that the Defendants, County Treasurer and Board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, claim no right, title, or interest in the subject real property.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Plaintiff have and recover judgment against the Defendants, Jimmy Owens, Linda Owens, Milan M. Martin, and Reva L. Martin in the sum of \$55,379.36, plus interest at the rate of 11.5 percent per annum from February 1, 1986 until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the current legal rate of 5.77 percent per annum until paid, plus the costs of this action accrued and accruing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendants, County Treasurer and Board of County Commissioners, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, have no right, title, or interest in the subject real property.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that upon the failure of said Defendants, Jimmy Owens, Linda Owens, Milan M. Martin, and Reva L. Martin to satisfy the money judgment of the Plaintiff herein, an Order of Sale shall be issued to the United States Marshal for the Northern District of Oklahoma, commanding him to advertise and sell with appraisement the real property involved herein and apply the proceeds of the sale as follows:

First:

In payment of the costs of this action accrued and accruing incurred by the Plaintiff, including the costs of sale of said real property;

Second:

In payment of the judgment rendered herein in favor of the Plaintiff.

The surplus from said sale, if any, shall be deposited with the Clerk of the Court to await further Order of the Court.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that from and after the sale of the above-described real property, under and by virtue of this judgment and decree, all of the Defendants and all persons claiming under them since the filing of the Complaint, be and they are forever barred and foreclosed of any right, title, interest or claim in or to the subject real property or any part thereof.


S/ JAMES O. ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

LAYN R. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney


PETER BERNHARDT
Assistant United States Attorney


DORIS FRANSEIN
Assistant District Attorney
Attorney for Defendants,
County Treasurer and
Board of County Commissioners,
Tulsa County, Oklahoma

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NOV 25 1986

FRANK HORN,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.) No. 86-C-137-E
)
BETTY HORTON and RAYMOND)
HOLDER,)
)
Defendants.)


JUDGMENT DISMISSING ACTION
BY REASON OF SETTLEMENT

The Court has been advised by counsel that this action has been settled, or is in the process of being settled, therefore, it is not necessary that the action remain upon the calendar of the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this Order and to reopen the action upon cause shown within 100 days that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk forthwith serve copies of this judgment by United States mail upon the attorneys for the parties appearing this action.

Dated this 24th day of November, 1986.




JAMES P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

G. ALAN COTNER,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	No. 86-C-41-B
)	
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

It is hereby stipulated by and between the Plaintiff, G. Alan Cotner, and Defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company, that the above-styled and captioned matter may be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice without costs to either party.


 Gary L. Hobaugh
 GARY L. RICHARDSON & ASSOCIATES
 7030 South Yale, Suite 601
 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136
 (918) 492-7674
 Attorneys for Plaintiff


 Thomas G. Marsh (OBA #5706)
 MARSH & ARMSTRONG
 808 ONEOK Plaza
 100 West Fifth Street
 Tulsa, OK 74103
 (918) 587-0141
 Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

1986
AUG 24 1986

WILLIAM S. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORMAN R. AKERS and)	
VICKI AKERS PRATT,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
vs.)	No. 86-C-43-C
)	No. 86-C-48-C
)	(Consolidated)
DONALD HODEL, Secretary of the)	
United States Department of)	
the Interior,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

O R D E R

Now before the Court for its consideration are the Findings and Recommendations of the Magistrate filed August 7, 1986. Objections were filed by the plaintiffs Norman R. Akers and Vicki Akers Pratt on August 21, 1986. Therefore, the issues are ready for this Court's determination.

This case involves the will of Victor Akers, a deceased person of Indian heritage. The Superintendent of the Osage Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs issued an order disapproving the will of Mr. Akers on the grounds that he was suffering from an insane delusion at the time the will was signed. The Superintendent further determined the insane delusion materially affected the terms of the will, and therefore it was ordered that the will be disapproved pursuant to §5(a) of the Osage Indian Act of 1978,

92 Stat. 1660. The decision was appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, and the order was affirmed.

The plaintiffs, both named beneficiaries under the disapproved will, brought this action seeking judicial review of the decision and order entered by the Secretary of the Interior. The plaintiffs allege that the decedent was not an Osage Indian, but a Pawnee Indian. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, the will was not subject to the provisions of the Osage Indian Act, and the Agency did not have the authority to disapprove it. Plaintiffs further allege the Superintendent's finding of an insane delusion was against the clear weight of evidence and was erroneous in law.

The Magistrate recommended that the order filed by the Secretary of the Interior be affirmed. This determination was based on the finding that Mr. Akers was properly considered an Osage Indian for the purposes of will probate, and further that the finding of an insane delusion was not against the clear weight of the evidence or was erroneous in law.

The scope of review granted to this Court by section 5(a) of the Osage Indian Act is very limited. Section 5(a) provides that "appeals shall be on the record made before the Secretary and his decisions shall be binding and shall not be reversed unless the same is against the clear weight of the evidence or erroneous in law."

The Court, after independent review of the record, finds that the order filed by the Secretary of the Interior is not against the clear weight of the evidence nor is it erroneous in law.

Therefore, premises considered, it is the Order of the Court that the order of the Secretary of the Interior is hereby affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of November, 1986.



H. DALE COOK
Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

FILED

NOV 24 1986

JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

OKLAHOMA BLACK OFFICERS, INC.,)
et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
vs.)
)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

No. 83-C-246-B

HON. THOMAS R. BRETT

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL CLAIMS
OF PLAINTIFF ALVIN R. McDONALD AGAINST FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE AND ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED FOP DEFENDANTS


This matter having come before the Court upon the filing of the attached Stipulation, the Court being advised in the premises and good cause having been shown, now therefore:


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all claims and causes of action of Plaintiff Alvin R. McDonald against the Defendant Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named FOP Defendants in the above-referenced action and contained in the Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint shall be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that no party shall be entitled to attorney's fees or costs as a result of this Order.

S/ THOMAS R. BRETT
THOMAS R. BRETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:


Richard Quiggle, Attorney for
Plaintiffs


Hal F. Morris, Attorney for
Fraternal Order of Police and all
Individually Named FOP Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 24 1986

OKLAHOMA BLACK OFFICERS, INC.,)
et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
vs.)
)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

JACK G. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

No. 83-C-246-B

HON. THOMAS R. BRETT

**FINAL JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PLAINTIFF ALVIN R. McDONALD AND
IN FAVOR OF FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
AND ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED FOP DEFENDANTS**

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is
HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that final judgment is entered in
favor of the Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named
FOP Defendants and against Plaintiff Alvin R. McDonald, and all
claims of Plaintiff Alvin R. McDonald in this action and con-
tained in the Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint against
the Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named FOP
Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are
to pay their respective costs, including attorney's fees.

Dated this 24 day of November, 1986.

S/ THOMAS R. BRETT

THOMAS R. BRETT
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 24 1983

MARK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

OKLAHOMA BLACK OFFICERS, INC.,)
et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
vs.)
)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

No. 83-C-246-B

HON. THOMAS R. BRETT

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF ALL CLAIMS
OF PLAINTIFF STANLEY M. RHINE AGAINST FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE AND ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED FOP DEFENDANTS

This matter having come before the Court upon the filing of the attached Stipulation, the Court being advised in the premises and good cause having been shown, now therefore:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all claims and causes of action of Plaintiff Stanley M. Rhine against the Defendant Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named FOP Defendants in the above-referenced action and contained in the Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint shall be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that no party shall be entitled to attorney's fees or costs as a result of this Order.

ST. THOMAS R. BRETT

THOMAS R. BRETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:


Richard Quiggle, Attorney for
Plaintiffs


Hal F. Morris, Attorney for
Fraternal Order of Police and all
Individually Named FOP Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 24 1986

JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

OKLAHOMA BLACK OFFICERS, INC.,)
et al.,)
)
Plaintiffs,)
)
vs.)
)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)

No. 83-C-246-B

HON. THOMAS R. BRETT

FINAL JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PLAINTIFF STANLEY M. RHINE AND
IN FAVOR OF FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
AND ALL INDIVIDUALLY NAMED FOP DEFENDANTS

In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that final judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named FOP Defendants and against Plaintiff Stanley M. Rhine, and all claims of Plaintiff Stanley M. Rhine in this action and contained in the Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the Fraternal Order of Police and all individually named FOP Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The parties are to pay their respective costs, including attorney's fees.

Dated this 24th day of November, 1986.

S/ THOMAS R. BRETT

THOMAS R. BRETT
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE



Patrick H. Kernan, OBA #4983
Exchange Tower
4500 South Garnett
Suite 900
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74146
Tele: (918) 664-1403
Attorney for Plaintiff -
Warren and Shirley Black



DANIEL R. GRIPE, OBA #3630
P. O. Box 308
Yale, Oklahoma 74085
Tele: (918) 387-2182
Attorney for Defendants -
Burton Cave and James F. Barnett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NOV 21 1986


GARY L. YOCUM,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 McDONALD'S CORPORATION, a)
 foreign corporation,)
)
 Defendant.)

86-C-280-C

ORDER OF REMAND

There being no diversity of citizenship between the parties nor any federal question involved, the Court finds that this case was improvidently removed from Tulsa County District Court. It is therefore Ordered that this case be remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447.

It is so Ordered this 20th day of November, 1986.


H. DALE COOK, CHIEF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

NOV 21 1986

JACK C. SILVER, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT


KMS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, INC.,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	No. 84-C-917-C
)	
KMS RESEARCH LABORATORIES, INC.,)	
and GERALD SEITZ,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between counsel for all
the parties hereto as follows:


1. All claims presented by the Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees from this case.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:



 J. Denny Moffett
 CONNER & WINTERS
 2400 First National Tower
 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
 (918) 586-5711

Attorneys for Defendant,
KMS RESEARCH LABORATORIES, INC.



John D. Rothman
MARSH & ARMSTRONG
808 Oneok Place
100 West Fifth Street
Tulsa, OK 74103
(918) 587-0141

Attorney for Plaintiff,
KMS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NATHAN SCOTT SEALS,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
vs.)
)
JERRY D. POWERS and POWERS)
ENERGY, INC.,)
)
Defendants.)

FILED
FEB 21 1983

CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

No. 86-C-230-B

STIPULATION OF
APPLICATION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE


COME NOW the Plaintiff, Nathan Scott Seals, and the Defendants, Jerry D. Powers and Powers Energy, Inc., by and through their respective attorneys, and move this Court to dismiss all causes of action with prejudice, for the reason that all of the matters, causes of action and issues in the Complaint and Counter-claim have been settled, compromised and released herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Plaintiff, Nathan Scott Seals, and the Defendants, Jerry D. Powers and Powers Energy, Inc., and each of them do move the Court to order a dismissal with prejudice of the Complaint and Counter-claim of Seals v. Powers and Powers Energy, Inc., and all causes of action therein, in the above styled and numbered matter.

C. RABON MARTIN


Attorney for the Plaintiff

ALFRED B. KNIGHT


Attorney for the Defendants